



# RHULA WEEKLY

## MOZAMBIQUE MEDIA REVIEW




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In Focus – 400<sup>th</sup> Edition Special:  
A message from the CEO



Cabo Delgado insurgency a  
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## EU to assist with equipment in Cabo Delgado – President Nyusi



Coal boom triggers Mozambique’s  
biggest port to triple capacity



TotalEnergies “will take as much time as  
is necessary” for security to return

## A Lull in Insurgent Activity, and Increasing Signs of ISCAP Cooperation

The past week in Cabo Delgado has been marked by a relative lull in insurgent activity, at least according to currently available information. In one of the few reported incidents of the past week, on Thursday (10 February 2022), local militia members patrolling near Namuembe Village captured an insurgent. Information indicates that the captive claimed his group's base is near Nangade Town and that most of the group's leadership consists of Tanzanian nationals. The intelligence provided by the captured insurgent allowed the militia to set a counterinsurgency ambush near Namuembe, reportedly resulting in six insurgents killed and a further 12 injured. The militia involved in the operation indicated that they could have been more successful if they had access to more modern weapons and more ammunition. An information source claimed that some of the militia members involved in the operation were equipped with only bows and arrows, and that those with firearms eventually had to stand down as their ammunition was being depleted. Rhula's closed sources further reported insurgent movements near Chai Village (Macomia District), on Sunday (13 February 2022), as well as movement between the towns of Macomia and Mucojo, on Monday (14 February 2022). Privileged information sources claimed that the insurgents in Chai have been reinforced by additional combatants, reportedly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – although information on the link to the DRC remains unconfirmed at this stage.

Since the beginning of the year, insurgents have been increasing their attacks in the Macomia and Meluco districts, particularly in close proximity to a key stretch of road – the EN380, which connects Macomia Town with the southern parts of Cabo Delgado Province. While the lull in insurgent activity has, so far, only presented for one week, it is worth reiterating that a lull has, in the past, preceded significant insurgent incursions, such as the March 2021 attack on Palma. Moreover, closed sources have alluded to some of the insurgency's tactics, particularly movement and attack patterns, prior to the March 2021 attack on Palma, and suggested that the increase in insurgent attacks in the Meluco and Macomia districts present some similarities. To this end, it is worth noting that several incursions were reported in the districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade and Palma, in the two months leading up to the March 2021 attack on Palma. The distribution of the insurgents' activity meant that overland access to Palma (through both Mocímboa da Praia and Nangade) was effectively disrupted. Early in March 2021, the incursions shifted to mostly Nangade – and none in Palma District. Then, on 24 March 2021 the insurgents executed a multi-pronged attack on Palma Town (see **Rhula's Special Report on the Palma Attack – March 2021**). Recently, there have been rumours on the ground in Cabo Delgado that the insurgents may be planning a largescale attack. The rumours, along with the recent insurgent movements in Macomia District, coupled with the current apparent lull in insurgent attacks, may be warning signs of a potential impending large-scale attack in Macomia.

However, it is worth emphasising that not all insurgent-related lulls have been followed by significant insurgent attacks. The trends highlighted in the previous paragraph serve to highlight potential red flags that could be indicative of an impending attack. Moreover, even when there is a lull in reported insurgent activity, it is still entirely possible for some incidents to go unreported as information from the active conflict zone is often limited or restricted. It is, therefore, possible that the current apparent lull may only be a lull in reporting, rather than a lull in insurgent activity. Caution, however, is advised regardless, as the conflict in Cabo Delgado remains highly volatile and uncertain. Additionally, the insurgency has a high degree of variability making the group extremely difficult to predict. The insurgents have proven their ability to gather and use intelligence to influence their target selection. As such, subtle changes in the operational environment could outweigh pre-set plans, adding to the difficulty of predicting what the insurgents might do next.

An aspect of the conflict that is particularly uncertain and vague is the involvement of foreign influence in the insurgency, particularly from the DRC – a country from where the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP) also operates. By now it is common knowledge that the Cabo Delgado insurgency has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, particularly to ISCAP, although the extent of this relationship remains debatable. Unconfirmed reports of insurgents in Chai being reinforced by combatants from the DRC, however, comes shortly after Salim Rashid was arrested in the DRC, accused of cooperating with the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Rashid is a fugitive from Kenya, where he faces charges of terrorism after being deported from Turkey where he was arrested trying to enter Syria. According to Kenyan court records, intelligence reports and a forensic analysis of phone calls between Rashid and a suspected accomplice, Richard Lazarus Kivatsi, suggest that Rashid had fled to Mozambique where he joined the Cabo Delgado insurgency. With Rashid being arrested in the DRC, on 29 January 2022, there are increasing signs of more active cooperation between the DRC's ADF and Mozambique's insurgency.

## Foreign Deployment Developments

Considering the poor situation of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Mission in Mozambique's (SAMIM) funding, logistics and combat support (see **Rhula Weekly Issue 398; 26 January-2 February 2022**), the Southern African joint forces in Cabo Delgado (including the Mozambican forces) are likely to be in dire need of funding and support. To this end, President Nyusi has called on the European Union (EU) to finance the military forces of Rwanda and the SAMIM. Nyusi said that the ongoing counterinsurgency effort "involves high costs for [Mozambique's] partners. They will not continue for a long time, [nor] forever, and operations can be affected [if financial support is cut]." After meeting with EU diplomats in Brussels (Belgium), between Monday and Wednesday (7 and 9 February 2022), Nyusi said that the EU will send "equipment" to Cabo Delgado, as part of its resolve to assist Mozambique's conflict against the insurgency.

Rwanda might likely enjoy financial support from the EU, considering that Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity of the EU Military Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique), has said that the EU is "quite determined to respond favourably" to Rwanda's request for financial support (see **Rhula Weekly 397; 19-26 January 2022**). The SAMIM, however, is still scrambling for funding with at least three options currently available, according to *Amani Africa*. First is the African Peace Facility's (APF) Early Response Mechanism (ERM), an EU initiative worth €55 million, which provides the African Union (AU) and regional communities (including SADC) with funds that are immediately available for the management or prevention of violent conflicts – although this does not allow the purchase of lethal military equipment, including ammunition. Second is the European Peace Facility (EPF), which replaced the APF in 2021 – this does allow the purchase of lethal military equipment. Third is the Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, which has been providing equipment to member states involved in conflicts. At this stage, each member state of the SADC is funding their deployments, with assistance from SADC reserves, but the deployed member states are not able to maintain their deployments much longer, with some already indicating that they would have to withdraw within the next two months if external funding is not secured soon (see **Rhula Weekly Issue 398; 26 January-2 February 2022**).

While Nyusi has recently been on a diplomatic expedition to secure support and funding for the forces currently deployed in Cabo Delgado, it remains to be seen if the SAMIM forces will secure funding in time – before the mission dissipates as member states' funding dries up. Rwanda, on the other hand, is likely to stay with information pointing towards TotalEnergies

and the EU favouring the country’s involvement in Cabo Delgado. Despite all efforts to assist the counterinsurgency forces, an equal effort is critically important to address the underlying factors fuelling the insurgency.

New Report Promotes LNG as Transitional Energy Source

A new report by the National Business Initiative (NBI), Business Unity South Africa and the Boston Consulting Group, titled *The Role of Gas in South Africa’s Path to Net-Zero*, reiterates the role liquefied natural gas (LNG) may play in Africa’s and, in the report’s context, South Africa’s transition away from emissions-intensive fossil fuels, towards cleaner energy sources. The report found that LNG may provide a pathway to help South Africa achieve a net-zero by 2050, serving as a transitional energy source. The LNG path is less complex and capital intensive than pathways based on the possible exploration and development of domestic gas fields and/or the building of a pipeline to import gas from Northern Mozambique. In the LNG pathway, the report recommends a multi-hub approach with Floating Storage Regasification Units (FSRUs) in South Africa’s Richards Bay, Coega and Saldanha, as well as in Mozambique’s Matola. A particular emphasis is placed on developing FSRUs in Richards Bay to promote supply from Matola to South Africa’s inland markets. In conclusion, the report states that “gas can, if affordably sourced, play a critical role as a transition energy source in South Africa’s net-zero journey. Gas can minimise cumulative emissions in the economy to 2050 and yield socio-economic benefits like maintaining jobs and economic activity in key sectors.”


Amid the global movement towards sustainable and clean energy, LNG remains a controversial energy source with some studies even arguing that LNG is “neither clean nor particularly low in emissions” (see **Rhula Weekly Issue 377; 4-11 August 2021**). However, for developing and underdeveloped countries (like most of Africa), LNG still seems like the lesser of two fossil fuel evils. As the NBI report argues, LNG is also less capital intensive – a critical component to consider for countries needing to transition from cheap coal the more expensive renewable energy sources. With Mozambique’s current LNG aspirations (which still significantly depend on the stability of Cabo Delgado), continued discussions and studies on LNG as a transitional fuel remains imperative to the country’s future economic prospects – as well as to how profitable the LNG sector would be for foreign stakeholders. Furthermore, while the report advises against the “significant political and security risks” associated with a gas pipeline from Northern Mozambique to South Africa, LNG can still be exported from Cabo Delgado (once production starts) to South Africa, or any other African country. Despite the report emphasising that “gas will need to be substituted with greener alternatives and phased out by 2050” in South Africa, the findings still provide another building block for the argument in favour of LNG as a transitional energy source for Africa.

COVID-19: New Omicron BA.2 Subvariant

The relative plateau in Mozambique’s COVID-19 statistics continued this week, with the number of new cases almost halving from the previous week – although the number of tests conducted also decreased notably, which could contribute to a lower number of detected cases. Recoveries, however, have slowed down significantly with this week’s recoveries only amounting to one-third of the previous week’s recoveries.

Several studies were released in the past week analysing a new Omicron subvariant, currently identified as BA.2. A study published by the University of Tokyo suggests that the subvariant may spread faster than the original Omicron variant, and may cause more severe disease, while largely circumventing the immunity provided by current vaccines. The study, however, notes that a booster shot restores some protection, making illness after infection about 74% less likely. A study by South Africa’s National Institute for Communicable Diseases, analysing close to 100,000 cases, however, found that (at least in that country) the BA.2 subvariant does not cause significantly more severe disease than the original Omicron variant. Instead, in the South African study, patients infected with the new subvariant suffered from similar rates of severe disease and hospitalisation as those with the original Omicron strain. South African researchers, however, cautioned that the country may differ from elsewhere, as most immunity in the country comes from prior COVID-19 infection rather than vaccination. Approximately 80% of the population is thought to have been infected, while just 29% of the population has had a full vaccination course and only 1.3% have received a booster. In contrast, around 72% of the EU population and 63% in the United States (US) have received initial immunisations, and 47% and 27% have gotten boosters, respectively. At the end of January 2022, studies in South Africa indicate that 80% of COVID-19 infections in the country were due to the new subvariant – up from just 5% in December 2021.

The disclaimer, embodied in the South African researchers’ word of caution, is notable as the Japanese study may reflect the situation in more developed countries, where immunity is more focused around immunisation, rather than previous infection. Mozambique, however, may likely experience a similar trend as South Africa, considering the significant traffic between the two countries. The original Omicron variant has also been dominant in Mozambique since January 2022 (see **Rhula Weekly Issue 396: 15 December 2021-19 January 2022**), making it plausible that the subvariant may also be present in the country. With most of the restrictive measures alleviated in Mozambique, it remains to be seen if the BA.2 subvariant will spark another wave of infections, or if the country has developed some degree of herd immunity, potentially buffering the population against the worst of the new subvariant.



COVID-19 18 February 2022 09:30							
Global							
Cases	419,693,180	Deaths	5,862,740	Vaccine Doses Administered	10,304,687,211		
Mozambique							
Cases	224,791	Deaths	2,189	Recoveries	218,694	Tests	1,253,662
Weekly Increase (Number)	0.1% (232)	Weekly Increase (Number)	<0.1% (1)	Weekly Increase (Number)	0.3% (743)	Weekly Increase (Number)	0.8% (9,394)
Overall Positivity Rate	17.9%	Weekly Positivity Rate	2.5%	Active Cases	3,904		

Sources: WHO, CDC, ECDC, NHC, DXY, AP & Mozambique Ministry of Health  
Prepared by Focus Group  
Disclaimer: Numbers are correct as per dashboard update each Friday morning – articles in Weekly content may be outdated at time of distribution.  
Provincial distribution and tests correct as per Wednesday 16:00

## 400<sup>TH</sup> EDITION SPECIAL: A MESSAGE FROM THE CEO

The 400<sup>th</sup> edition of the Rhula Weekly marks more than eight years of involvement in Mozambique. When did Rhula Intelligent Solutions, and the Weekly, start in Mozambique, and what was the reason for developing the product in the first place?

Rhula was formally registered in 2012, and, at that time, everyone in Mozambique was preparing for the oil and gas boom. Mozambique, however, was still experiencing attacks by Renamo dissidents and, in 2016, the country heard about the massive debt scandal (now known as the “Hidden Debts” scandal). While establishing ourselves, we quickly realised that people were not properly informed – everyone was simply reading the news and making wild assumptions, similar to what is happening today with Cabo Delgado and the insurgency problem.

Because of our previous experience, we decided to come up with the Rhula Mozambique Weekly Media Review. Our idea was basically to look at credible news agencies and stories which reported factual information and provide a curated summary of the most significant events in the country. It is important to note that during this time – and like we have always done – we stayed true to our company vision of being intelligence-driven, meaning that we collect in-country information from different sources. Through understanding the cultural nuances, we are able to put things into perspective, and that is how the Rhula Weekly was born.

Looking back at our first edition, I cannot help but have a bit of a laugh, because Nigel Morgan and I sat in this small apartment, sleeping on camping beds, and eating bully beef (corned beef), while constantly debating what should be included in the Rhula Weekly. It made for some good conversation, and, like any good debate, it involved some “differences of opinion”, but we eventually agreed. They were good times, thinking back to those days.


### How has the Rhula Weekly evolved over the years?

Well, the Rhula Weekly sort of took on a life of its own. I started it, a little haphazardly to be honest, and then Nigel took it over. He, unfortunately, passed away a few years ago, but people will remember him. Nigel spent a little too much time on the Rhula Weekly, well that was my feeling at the time, but in hindsight, he did the right thing. Nigel brought another dimension and insight to the Rhula Weekly in the form of the Pointers.


Now, it is important to mention that one of our close friends, Paulo Mendonça, was the one who suggested we add the Pointers section to the Rhula Weekly, so credit needs to go to Paulo. The whole issue of interpreting the news and understanding local nuances was what sparked the idea from Paulo. The Pointers section was raised during one of our infamous lunches where we invited CEOs, military experts, diplomats and other interested parties, and we just spoke about events in Mozambique. After Nigel’s untimely passing, we took a small dip for a month or two but seeing that we have good people on the team, they stepped up and made the Rhula Weekly their own, continuing to evolve the product to what it currently is today.

So where are we now with the Rhula Weekly in 2022? Well, we now have a team working full-time on the product, conducting research, analysis and quality checks, and then of course we have people in the field who cooperate with the “back office” team, providing closed source on-the-ground information for important insight. The Rhula Weekly has come a long way, but I do feel that the product is evolving monthly, with better interpretations of news events, more information flowing from the ground-level, and a subscriber base that has grown in the thousands over the last couple of years.


I honestly believe that the Rhula Weekly is the go-to weekly newsletter if you really want to know what is going on in Mozambique.



The first edition of the Rhula Weekly.



Further changes were introduced.



Last week’s edition.

**A critical aspect of Rhula Intelligent Solutions is how it manages intelligence. As one would expect, intelligence comes with an array of challenges to overcome. From your point of view, why would you say that intelligence may sometimes fail, and how does Rhula overcome some of the inherent challenges in order to utilise intelligence effectively for its clients?**

*I am a firm believer that people do not really understand the difference between information and intelligence. It is also important to understand the intelligence cycle, which is core to our approach as a company. In today's world, we have all become collectors of information, more than ever. This is mainly because of the current easy access to an array of information sources, as well as new widely shared information sources such as social media and so on, but herein lies the problem. Most people believe what they read, yet the information and the source of the information are not properly vetted.*

*Intelligence failures are fairly common, but I cannot help but think that companies or individuals do not really ask why it fails. They often seem to not attempt to determine the root cause of intelligence failures. The problem is not the solution i.e., an intelligence-driven solution. The problem is fourfold: First, who is driving this effort? Do the people you use to collect intelligence actually have an understanding of how to effectively manage it?; Second, buy-in from executive management is sketchy at best; Third, mainly open-source media is used to collect the information – resulting in armchair analysts; Fourth, telling the client what you think they want to hear instead of telling the client what the intelligence is actually telling you, and so the list goes on.*

*So, what is the challenge for Rhula? Simply trying to show the client how important intelligence collection is. Instead of increasing guards, increasing K9 units and other reactive measures, they often fail to invest in probably the most important function that all companies or operations should have: the collection of information by on-the-ground sources (HUMINT). Once the information is verified and the source of the information is vetted, we produce intelligence – this is the only way one moves from a state of being reactive to an operational state of being proactive.*

*The unfortunate reality is that mediocrity has become the norm in our industry and getting buy-in, real buy-in, from clients is the most difficult part for me. If most companies had an intelligence-driven approach, the Palma attack in March 2020 would have been foreseen. The people we have spoken to i.e., a client at that point, knew it was coming in time, and they were prepared.*

**How has Rhula Intelligent Solutions incorporated intelligence into the current Rhula Weekly?**

*The simple fact of the matter is that through our in-country sources (myself, for example, visiting the camps of internally displaced people in Cabo Delgado), speaking to the local communities, conducting focus groups in-country or in the area of operations, provides invaluable insight when it comes to providing context. To me, the feel, the smell, and the experience of the in-country reality is important, as this allows for proper analysis. Our readers know that what we provide to them is not fairy-tale analysis, but a reality; a from-the-ground perspective.*

**Since their first attack in 2017, the insurgency has drawn significant attention to Mozambique, and Cabo Delgado in particular. With the increasing coverage of the conflict, and of Mozambique's politics, what would you say distinguishes the Rhula Weekly, and Rhula Intelligent Solutions, from other newsletters and information services?**

*Well, first of all, Focus Group (of which Rhula is a subsidiary) has a regional view on the problem, because of our footprint not just being in Mozambique but also in South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This allows us to consider other angles of the insurgency currently playing out in Cabo Delgado. These angles include the money flow, logistical support, access to detainees, the information obtained in the DRC and so on. Of course, we cannot publish all the information in the Rhula Weekly, but we do, however, understand the problem.*

*We also know that the problem is not going to go away overnight. If you consider the money flowing to the insurgent groups in Cabo Delgado versus what it currently costs the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to be deployed in Mozambique, I personally believe the insurgents can stick it out longer at this stage.*

**Joe van der Walt**


Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Rhula Intelligent Solutions, a Subsidiary of Focus Group

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

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info@focusholding.net

# INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

## PAST ACTIVITY




## CURRENT ACTIVITY




## TOTAL RECORDED INCIDENTS OVER 6 MONTHS

(01/09/2021 – 16/02/2022)



## TOTAL RECORDED INCIDENTS OVER 6 WEEKS

(06/01/2022 – 16/02/2022)



**Disclaimer:** These figures refer only to militant-orchestrated incidents recorded in Cabo Delgado Province and do not include operations carried out by the FDS or by the population. Some attacks are unconfirmed at the time of Rhula Weekly distribution. Incident records are updated on an ongoing basis. Rhula reserves the right to change incident statistics as updated information becomes available.

## SECURITY & CRIME

### Insecurity in the North

#### EU to assist with equipment in Cabo Delgado – President Nyusi

President Nyusi said that the European Union (EU) will send “equipment” to Cabo Delgado as part of its resolve to assist the Southern African country fend off insurgents. This after Nyusi, in meetings with EU top diplomats in Brussels (Belgium), between Monday and Wednesday (7-9 February 2022), asked for more support in the war-torn province.

“Within days, we will surely have support in terms of equipment which the EU uses and which is [currently] in Cameroon,” Nyusi said at a press briefing.

Almost a million people have been displaced by the ongoing insurgency and more than 3,000 have been declared dead in the gas-rich province since the beginning of the attacks in October 2017.

At the end of 2021, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) managed to reclaim some areas in the province.

Nyusi, during his meetings with the EU, warned that the situation was still volatile. “We have made it clear that substantial risks prevail, although the situation is encouraging, us having occupied the district headquarters and some [insurgent] bases having been fully destroyed.” “This situation can, at any moment, evolve again and expand to other regions of the country and even outside the borders,” he said.

At the SADC Extraordinary Summit held in Malawi in early January 2022, member states agreed to continue their mission for the next three months. A few days before, Nyusi held meetings with his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame, who also vowed to continue supporting the battle against insurgents in Cabo Delgado.

But in those separate engagements, both parties raised the cost issue of deploying their forces as a constraint. Rwanda would later ask for financial support from the EU, which will probably be granted as the EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) is already training Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado.

In confirming the financial constraints to the EU, Nyusi said: “The combat involves high costs for our partners. They will not continue for a long time, forever, and operations can be affected [if financial support is cut].”

Numerous think tanks argue that the crisis in Cabo Delgado is due to legitimate economic and political grievances that should be addressed in order to build peace. Although complicated, they also include a long-standing grievance about marginalisation, particularly since the discovery of oil and gas in the province.

[Source: News24](#)

#### President Nyusi calls on EU to finance joint forces of Rwanda and SADC in Cabo Delgado

On Wednesday (9 February 2022), Nyusi called on the EU to finance the military forces of Rwanda and the SADC in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado.

“The combat involves high costs for our partners (...). They will not continue for a long time, forever, and operations can be affected,” if there is no support, he said. “The European Union is aware,” added Nyusi, at a press conference as he was leaving Brussels.

Nyusi, who completed a three-day visit to the European capital, in which he contacted several EU leaders, said: “We don’t have anything to give, despite a lot of effort. We don’t lack the will”. “If we can be part of the joint group that mobilises support, we will do that”, both with the EU and with “other partners”, Nyusi said, referring that, just a few days ago, he did so at the meetings within the African Union (AU) summit, in Addis Ababa.

“Within days we will surely have support in terms of equipment which the EU uses and which is [currently] in Cameroon”, he said, without further details.

About the situation in Cabo Delgado, Nyusi left some warnings. “We have made it clear that substantial risks prevail, although the situation is encouraging, us having occupied the district headquarters and some [insurgent] bases having been fully destroyed,” he told reporters. “This situation can, at any moment, evolve again and expand to other regions of the country and even outside the borders”, he underlined.

Nyusi stressed that it is in the interest of the Mozambican government to “ensure the fight against terrorism”, speaking of the “need to support the intervening parties so that they can carry out their mission”.

At the same time, Nyusi called for support for the reform of the State in the Defence and Security sector, which he hopes to “guarantee capacity in the future” and which means “training and specialisation”.

At the end of January 2022, the head of the EUTM Mozambique, aimed at training troops against the armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado, admitted to support Rwanda, which has troops deployed in the northern region of the country. Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean said that Rwanda requested “greater financial support” and that the head of European diplomacy “is quite determined to respond favourably”.

[Source: Club of Mozambique / Lusa](#)

### **Cabo Delgado insurgency a classic case of the resource curse**

The Cabo Delgado insurgency has been described as a classic case of the resource curse, with the Mozambican government mainly addressing the insurgency in order to get liquefied natural gas (LNG) companies to return to the area.

Senior researcher and project leader for Southern Africa at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Liesl Louw-Vaudran, at a recent *defenceWeb* event on countering the insurgency in Mozambique said there are many who believe Mozambique is affected by the resource curse. This is when a country underperforms economically in spite of being home to valuable natural resources, and is vulnerable to violence and instability as well as corruption.

Louw-Vaudran does not see clear evidence of Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ) insurgents trying to occupy LNG sites or get control of natural gas resources. She believes the insurgents are motivated by a sense of injustice resulting from poor governance, neglect, and displacement due to mining – many residents of Cabo Delgado have been pushed off the land to make way for ruby mines. Economic marginalisation, poor governance, and greed are the main grievances the insurgents have.

Louw-Vaudran does not discount the role of LNG in the insurgency, but believes its main impact has been intensifying inequality in Mozambique, raising tensions and being used as a tool to promote and aggravate a sense of injustice amongst the population, which plays into the insurgents’ narrative.

“I think there is political will to resolve the crisis so there is security so that LNG companies can return to Cabo Delgado,” Louw-Vaudran said. “This gives us some indication why the SADC deployment was accepted. Urgent solutions were needed to secure the Afungi Peninsula.”

TotalEnergies, amongst other foreign companies, have major investments in Cabo Delgado. TotalEnergies alone has a roughly R308 billion LNG project investment off the coast of Northern

Mozambique. Louw-Vaudran believes that, as huge investments have already been made, it is hard for companies like TotalEnergies to withdraw – the LNG industry is also a huge boost for Mozambique.

“There are lots of strong rumours that Nyusi was pressured by TotalEnergies into accepting the intervention by Rwandan forces,” said Louw-Vaudran, adding that the French government denies giving any funding to the Rwandan forces. “We still do not know exactly who is funding this [Rwandan deployment] and what is the payback for Rwanda. We know there are some economic links and agreements that have been signed between Rwanda and Mozambique but this is the big problem, the agreements are not transparent,” said Louw-Vaudran.

On 31 January 2022, TotalEnergies and the Rwanda Development Board signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to develop collaboration on projects related to energies. A permanent representative office is being opened in Kigali.

Louw-Vaudran believes the long-term solution is for the Mozambican military to secure Cabo Delgado and then for the government to create employment and counter violent extremism. Addressing the root causes will not be a quick fix, however.

[Source: defenceWeb](#)

### **How Adaptive DDDR could help address violent extremism in Cabo Delgado**

Mozambique’s gas-rich Cabo Delgado Province has suffered violent extremism perpetrated by the ASWJ armed group since 2017. There are several drivers of this violence – in particular, high unemployment, poverty, and exclusion. In some cases, local communities have been uprooted from their land and lost their livelihoods to make way for the gas industry and export-oriented agriculture.

The drivers do not exist in a vacuum and are steeped in a set of underlying conditions – including lagging structural reforms – all of which help to create the conditions needed for socioeconomic grievances to fester, presenting ASWJ fertile ground for recruitment. This has led to an enormous humanitarian crisis. ASWJ has committed killings, beheadings, mutilation, torture, and mass abductions, among other atrocities, with the insurgency causing over 3,000 deaths and displacing more than 740,000 people since 2017.

On 15 July 2021, the SADC deployed its SAMIM to support efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism, in part to prevent the risk of regional contagion. A January 2022 SADC Extraordinary

Summit of Heads of State and Government reviewed the mission, and commended the progress made since its deployment – including restoring security to some districts of Cabo Delgado, which has allowed some 15,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) to return home. However, the security situation in the province remains volatile and many hostages and ASWJ combatants are unaccounted for.

Considering Cabo Delgado's complex and unstable conflict environment, one aspect that needs to be addressed is the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) of those ASWJ combatants that choose to return to civilian life.

Disarmament and demobilisation could contribute to security and stability by removing weapons from the hands of ASWJ combatants and detaching combatants from paramilitary structures. Rehabilitation (including disengagement and deradicalisation) and reintegration should ideally result in the rehabilitated former ASWJ members or associates returning to normal civilian life.

This article aims to advise local and regional policymakers on a potential DDRR programme in Cabo Delgado. Thus far, the government of Mozambique and its regional partners have focused their efforts on offensive operations, with Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (PVE/CT) resources dedicated primarily to the SADC and Rwandan missions. Although the situation remains highly volatile, such a programme could be introduced to either help to stabilise the province or to shore up any stabilisation gains in the future.

### Opportunities for Adaptive DDRR

The complexity of the Cabo Delgado context will require an adaptive approach to DDRR. Cedric de Coning has defined the adaptive peacebuilding concept as “a process where peacebuilders, together with the communities and people affected by the conflict, actively engage in a structured process to sustain peace and resolve conflicts by employing an iterative process of learning and adaptation.”

An adaptive peacebuilding approach to the DDRR of former ASWJ members would engage all stakeholders in a whole-of-society consultative process to collaboratively develop a common understanding of the structural drivers of violent extremism, and to develop and adapt home-grown DDRR programmes together.

Crucially, the whole-of-society approach could promote the complementary women, peace and security and youth, peace and security agendas. The participation of women and youth in adaptive DDRR of ASWJ members can contribute to

efforts to address the socioeconomic exclusion driving tensions and violent extremism in the province. It would develop local capacities for sustainable peace by empowering women and youth to play a leading role in peacebuilding. It would also help to ensure that DDRR programmes are not only context-specific but also gender- and age-responsive to differential needs, experiences, and statuses of individual women, men, and juveniles.

Significantly, Mozambique is already the site of ongoing Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) of Renamo combatants as part of the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and Renamo, which provides for the complete DDR of Renamo's armed wing as part of efforts to sustain peace in the country.

A Military Affairs Commission (MAC) composed of government and Renamo representatives manages the process, with a concomitant MoU on Military Affairs.

Renamo submitted a list of 5,221 combatants, of whom an estimated 7% were women, to the MAC. As of October 2021, just over half of the identified former Renamo fighters had been demobilised. Some of the ex-fighters were integrated into senior levels of the national security forces. The outstanding combatants remained at a DDR camp in Central Mozambique.

The ongoing collective Renamo DDR effort is distinct from adaptive DDRR, which requires the rehabilitative disengagement and deradicalisation of individuals who have fallen prey to radical ideologies. DDRR thus better caters to the challenges posed by highly ideological 21<sup>st</sup>-century insurgencies, particularly those connected to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS).

DDRR is also meant to be implemented in more complex environments, where a multitude of actors are engaged, and a peace deal is non-existent and perhaps unfeasible. This burdens would-be DDRR and PVE/CT practitioners with legal and operational challenges, including when, how, and with whom to engage.

Without a peace process where all or most of the combatants have at least rhetorically agreed to demobilise, DDRR instead aims to whittle away at these groups and their potential recruits by deradicalising individuals and reintegrating them into society.

The intricacy of the Cabo Delgado context thus presents an opportunity to use the adaptive approach of DDRR, creating more inclusive, people-oriented PVE/CT programming at the community level.

## Lessons from the Renamo DDR

Despite their differences, six crucial lessons learned from the Renamo process can serve as instructive inputs for future PVE/CT-related DDR of ASWJ combatants.

First, DDR benefits from a multi-stakeholder institutional framework, that helps build national ownership and increases self-sustainability – though some analysts have been critical of the initially dominant role of the Swiss-led peace process support. Given Cabo Delgado’s dynamic, complex, and unpredictable violent extremist environment, strong local ownership would be a critical cornerstone of potential DDR.

Significantly, the adaptive peacebuilding approach does not privilege externally imposed international programmes over endogenous processes, which creates meaningful opportunities for all stakeholders, and especially for local societies and communities, to co-own and co-manage the process. International partners’ structured engagement with Mozambican DDR stakeholders in iterative processes of learning and adaptation could help strike a balance between external support and local self-organisation.

Second, Renamo’s DDR narrowly focused on the combatants in line with the military provisions of the Maputo Accord and did not consider the needs and capacities of their dependents. Nor did it consider the families and communities that were affected by the armed conflict, and who were expected to absorb the bulk of ex-Renamo fighters.

Significantly, a whole-of-society approach to DDR in Cabo Delgado could learn from these shortcomings and proactively engage the affected individuals, families, and communities in a process aimed at preventing recidivism, mitigating further radicalisation, and strengthening overall community resilience to violent extremism.

Third, the ‘R’ (reintegration) under the Renamo process was still seen as a component of DDR rather than a broad set of socioeconomic processes in which the ex-fighters are central actors. Significantly, reintegration was not recognised as a complex process, influenced by varied factors for different ex-combatants according to their diverse settings. The demobilised fighters were each subjected to a uniform two-component reintegration support programme:

1. A reinsertion package of an estimated value of US\$1,000, consisting of tools, clothing, seeds, and other items for personal use, and

2. severance payments totalling US\$1,000 for a year regardless of age, gender, and status. An adaptive DDR process in Cabo Delgado should be sensitive to the heterogeneity of the former ASWJ combatants likely to be engaged in such a process.

Fourth, the Maputo Accord neglected to link DDR with transitional justice and reconciliation. For example, the name of the 2019 pact – Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation – implies the necessity of reconciliation between the signatory parties and the population, which bore the brunt of the armed conflict. However, in practice, the “Mozambican Solution” of a blanket amnesty for atrocities by both sides, without substantive reconciliation and restorative justice initiatives, perpetuated the deep-seated fear, trauma, and hatred of the victims and witnesses of human rights violations toward former combatants. Against this backdrop, an adaptive DDR approach in Cabo Delgado can capitalise on the complementarities between DDR, transitional justice, and reconciliation processes to help reconstitute trust between former combatants and communities.

Fifth, another lesson from the Renamo experience is that DDR must not be time-specific and rigid, and the process should allow for enough flexibility to innovatively find solutions to context-specific problems. In the Cabo Delgado context, adaptive DDR should invest in a proactive monitoring and feedback capacity that can generate the information the stakeholders need to continuously innovate and resolve new emerging setbacks and challenges.

Sixth, political and economic inclusion is required to address the structural inequalities underlying mobilisation, demobilisation, and reintegration of Renamo, and ASWJ, combatants into civilian life.

Significantly, the government has announced an inclusive socioeconomic development plan for Cabo Delgado which is aimed at addressing the push and pull factors behind violent extremism in the region.

In March 2020, the government created the Northern Integrated Development Agency (Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte – ADIN), which helped formulate the multisectoral 2021-2024 Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado. Multilateral partners should support the plan’s implementation in a non-intrusive manner to avoid disrupting the local self-organisation processes needed to sustainably prevent and counter violent extremism.

[Source: The Global Observatory](#)

## Winning peace in Mozambique's embattled north

Troops from Rwanda and SADC have helped stem an insurrection in Cabo Delgado that had, by early 2021, spiralled into a jihadist insurgency threatening regional security. The outside forces, working with Mozambique's army, have driven insurgents out of bases and taken control of key towns.

While many insurgents have quit fighting, small groups are still mounting attacks in parts of the province, leaving hundreds of thousands of people displaced and unsafe. Insurgents have now also sallied into neighbouring Niassa Province and Tanzania, amid fears that they will turn to the IS networks in East Africa for greater support.

To avoid a protracted conflict and regional crisis, Mozambique's partners should press Maputo to open dialogue with political elites who have influence in Cabo Delgado about how to induce more insurgents to surrender. The AU should facilitate better regional cooperation to block financial and material aid to the insurgency from nearby ISIS cells. The AU should also help identify more possible financing to support the deployments.

Since July 2021, more than 3,000 troops from Rwanda and the SADC member states have flooded into Cabo Delgado, where the insurgency had been wreaking havoc, displacing 900,000 people in a conflict that has killed more than 3,700 people since 2017. In a short period, the soldiers have dismantled all the insurgents' major bases and seized important territory they once held.

Rwandan forces, working under a bilateral agreement with Maputo, have secured the Afungi peninsula, where TotalEnergies has invested in a multibillion-dollar gas project, and recaptured the strategic port of Mocímboa da Praia. The SADC, invoking a regional mutual defence pact, has deployed troops in central Cabo Delgado and toward the provincial capital Pemba, as well as in Nangade District near the border with Tanzania. These troops have dislodged insurgents from some of their strongholds but are stretched in terms of fully securing these areas.

But the insurgency is far from extinguished. Many fighters have simply blended into the civilian population, waiting for the right time to remobilise. Small groups continue to stage attacks in central, coastal and northern parts of the province. The insurgency could thus easily rebound if foreign forces suddenly draw down.

Donors have meanwhile bankrolled a surge in aid geared toward rebuilding infrastructure,

restoring public services and helping some civilians resume their livelihoods amid the humanitarian crisis. The spending is unlikely, however, to quell the specific grievances of the young men who have joined al-Shabaab, as the insurgency is known. What insurgents really want, according to sources who know them, is a meaningful role in the Cabo Delgado economy, so they can benefit from the opportunities created by major mining and gas projects and perhaps have a stake in the province's smuggling rackets, many of which are run by political elites.

If the insurgents' motivations go unaddressed, the roots of the conflict will remain untreated.

Insurgents are finding ways to adapt to the Rwandan-SADC military pressure, pushing into next-door Niassa Province and staging a few attacks in Tanzania. They are also trying to deploy more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on the battlefield.

Officials fear that al-Shabaab fighters will seek money and training, including in bombmaking skills, from East African ISIS networks, such as that based in the northern tip of Puntland (Somalia), to keep their campaign going. Should it strengthen its ISIS ties, the insurgency could not only endure but also help turn Mozambique into a staging or training ground for fighters to menace areas of neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania. If insurgents then establish a firmer foothold in Tanzania, they could also deepen their links to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an ISIS affiliate in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which recruits Tanzanians into its ranks and has helped train Mozambican fighters in the past.

Mozambique and its regional partners should start thinking about how they might obtain peace through means other than military operations and development money, as these measures, on their own, are unlikely to stop conflict dead in its tracks. The authorities should work harder to set incentives for insurgents who might be persuaded to surrender or leave sleeper cells. Mozambique's regional partners, who also have an interest in seeing an end to the conflict, should push Maputo to open dialogue with local and national political elites, who in turn will have to make decisions about how to offer insurgents a viable future amid the resource boom under way in Cabo Delgado.

The authorities will still have to win the public's confidence by extending further development assistance, but dialogue with insurgents could help create a safer environment where such spending can yield even greater benefits. Meanwhile, the authorities should vigorously

prosecute the high-level al-Shabaab members whom they have arrested.

In cooperation with regional governments, Maputo will also need to step up efforts to block foreign financial and material support to al-Shabaab, in particular from ISIS, which is now taking root in East Africa.

The SADC is now setting up a regional counter-terrorism centre in Tanzania, where military, law enforcement, intelligence and judicial officials from member states can share information. To be maximally effective, it will require input from the member states of the two East African regional blocs, the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), given the spread of al-Shabaab's networks in that region.

To facilitate all this cooperation, the AU should look to ease communication and cooperation between member states of all these regions. Ideally, it should develop a common assessment of what ISIS is doing on the continent's eastern side. Armed with this information, authorities will be better able to close the net around those helping al-Shabaab from abroad.

While the above measures are underway, Mozambique will still need outside help to hold the territory that has been taken back from the insurgents. As the Mozambican army will likely require several years of upgrading before it can fully secure Cabo Delgado and other parts of the country's north, Rwandan and SADC troops may need to stay on the ground for some time to come. Both Rwanda and the southern African states may require additional financial resources to keep their forces in Mozambique, with the SADC troops, in particular, struggling to stamp out insurgent activity in the province's centre. While the EU, via its Peace Facility, can provide some of the troop contributors with limited support in the short term, the AU could also help identify alternative funding sources for the SADC mission.

#### International intervention in Cabo Delgado

For more than seven months, Rwandan and SADC forces have been in Cabo Delgado to battle homegrown insurgents backed by jihadists from up and down the Swahili coast. In early July 2021, a thousand troops from the RDF and Rwandan National Police (RNP) working under a bilateral arrangement with Maputo arrived in the Afungi peninsula, the site of the major liquefied gas project run by TotalEnergies. The Rwandan soldiers swiftly captured strategic road junctions in the area and then in early August 2021 took the port town of Mocímboa da Praia, the birthplace of the

insurrection, from which al-Shabaab had driven state authorities a year earlier.

Around this time, the SADC sent hundreds of troops as well, under the terms of a regional defence pact, to occupy Macomia District to the south of Afungi and Nangade District on the Tanzanian border, as well as areas near the provincial capital Pemba.

The separate forces, each operating in cooperation with the Mozambican army, would over the coming months run into insurgents, driving them from their bases and scattering them into smaller groups. In doing so, they captured insurgents, seized weapons and confiscated laptops whose files they mined for intelligence. They also killed a few mid-level insurgent leaders.

Rwandan forces now occupy the coast from Palma Town past Mocímboa da Praia, as well as areas to the west near the important towns of Muidumbe and Mueda. By December 2021, their ranks had swollen to 2,500 troops in total.

The SADC contingent, known as the SAMIM, has deployed in two sets, with mainly Batswana and South African troops fighting insurgents in Macomia and tasked with protecting roads to the northwest toward Mueda, to the southeast of Pemba. Tanzanian troops under SAMIM's banner have occupied areas stretching west from Palma through Nangade District. SAMIM's forces numbered 1,077 by the end of November 2021.

The combined operations have broken the insurgency's cohesion, dispersing its fighters from their bastions, but not stamped it out entirely. Al-Shabaab's numbers have dwindled from an estimated 3,000 or so to as low as 300, but mainly because many foreign jihadists have fled the country while Mozambican insurgents have melted into the civilian population rather than surrender or be killed. Indeed, by the end of 2021, officials reported that military operations had claimed the lives of 200 insurgents.

SAMIM sources say some of the group's core leaders remain holed up in Quirimbas National Park, straddling the Macomia and Quissanga coastal districts, where insurgents have staged several attacks on security personnel and civilians since September 2021. Insurgents have also mounted regular raids in Nangade and northern Mueda districts – and, since January 2022, about a dozen attacks in Meluco District as well.

Even as central and provincial authorities have started pushing the narrative that security has returned to Cabo Delgado, and that the state is restoring services to areas once dominated by

insurgents, civil servants and aid workers still assess the situation as fragile. Even with Mocímboa da Praia back in government hands, Maputo designates the town as a military zone, mostly off-limits to civilians, worrying that insurgents could infiltrate masses of residents coming back home. Officials in other areas also voice fears they could come under attack.

The displacement problem remains severe. Though some civilians have returned to Palma and other locations, almost 750,000 people from Cabo Delgado remain uprooted from their homes, the majority packed into camps largely in the province's south. While authorities have ordered many civilians to go to newly constructed settlements also in the south, many still need to risk returning to their places of origin. Some of them come under insurgent attack or suffer abuse at the military's hands. Mozambican troops in particular often shake down civilians for cash at checkpoints.

Hundreds of women and girls once held captive by the insurgents, and now released, are also struggling to win acceptance back into their communities, many having survived rape and sexual abuse by al-Shabaab elements in 2020, as the group mimicked the ISIS practice of taking so-called sex slaves as spoils of war.

The government has approved the disbursement of hundreds of millions in donor money for programmes such as seed distribution to farmers and reconstruction of infrastructure in Cabo Delgado. These efforts, coordinated from the government's side via ADIN, are assisting civilians trying to rebuild livelihoods amid an active conflict, though how much they will keep the insurgency from rebounding is unclear.

Mozambique's partners are thus preparing for a lengthy military campaign, spurred on by the realisation that they will need to wait for a major upgrade of the country's security forces before they can withdraw. Officials in Maputo believe the military will require several years of investment before it can manage without external assistance. In order to fully secure the province, they say, they will need more infantry on top of the 2,000 rapid-reaction forces now being trained by the EU to beat the insurgents. SAMIM officials thus say they are focused on strengthening the mission following its January 2022 mandate extension, amid concerns that it lacks sufficient resources.

Commanders are keen to secure outside funding for more men and materiel, particularly after a November 2021 insurgent attack exposed their vulnerability to guerrilla tactics. Maputo has meanwhile also extended its military cooperation agreement with Kigali, where authorities are

understood to be seeking financial assistance for the Rwandan deployment.

### Insurgents adapt and pose new threats

Despite being under military pressure, the insurgency is surviving. Many al-Shabaab fighters have simply resumed living among the civilian population, including in IDP camps where they are biding their time, while also recruiting more youth. Mozambican and foreign forces deployed in Cabo Delgado have noticed more and more IEDs planted along the roads they patrol. These devices are rudimentary, often relying on the victim rather than a remote system to trigger detonation, but their increasing use suggests that the insurgents are deliberately moving toward more asymmetric warfare. Security sources believe it is only a matter of time before insurgents are able to acquire more sophisticated roadside bombs, including from ISIS, which has forged links to al-Shabaab via its faction in Puntland.

The foreign fighters who came into Cabo Delgado also pose a continuing threat. Large numbers of Tanzanians and Kenyans seem to be leaving al-Shabaab as the military campaign proceeds. They could, however, simply join ISIS, which Western diplomats and security officials fear will conduct more operations like the suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala in November 2021. Regional security officials say these fighters are receiving training from ISIS, absorbing new knowledge including in bombmaking techniques that they can use on the battlefield and elsewhere in Mozambique, if and when they are able to return.

Meanwhile, evidence is mounting that al-Shabaab is opening a new front west of Cabo Delgado in Niassa Province, which is known for its mountainous wilderness, gold mines and hunting reserves. In August 2021, security in Niassa's central Mavago District began to deteriorate, marked by an ambush on a police vehicle. In late November 2021, insurgents then attacked Nualala, a village in Mecula District, raiding a health centre and attacking police units. More attacks took place in Mecula in the ensuing days, forcing up to 4,000 people to flee. Officials fear that insurgents may even try to destabilise the far southwest of Niassa, an area bordering Malawi, where tensions between Christians and Muslims could help Mozambican insurgents recruit more fighters to draw into Niassa.

Since the start of 2022, however, security sources and humanitarian workers report that insurgents may be slipping back to Cabo Delgado.

A detailed plan, found on an insurgent laptop captured in Cabo Delgado and seen by *Crisis Group*, explains why insurgents might see expansion into Niassa as profitable. They could take advantage of food and water supplies in the Niassa hunting reserves to build a new power centre in the north. It would also be easier for recruits to cross from Tanzania into Mozambique in Niassa, as the Rovuma River, which separates the two countries, is a mere trickle this far west. Conversely, and for the same reason, insurgents could mount more attacks in south-western Tanzania from Niassa. While the plan is ambitious, officials still fear that insurgents could thus stretch security forces far beyond Cabo Delgado, much as Frelimo guerrillas did to Portuguese forces in Mozambique's independence war.

Tanzania is another concern. Insurgents seem to be upping their attacks on villages and security posts in the Mtwara region of southern Tanzania from across the border in Cabo Delgado. Security sources believe these attacks indicate that the insurgents – who are on the back foot in Cabo Delgado – will turn their attention northward.

Indeed, in September 2021, a group of insurgents raided Mahurunga, a village of several thousand people, for food, abducting men and women from the area to carry the provisions back to the Mozambican side. In early December 2021, a group of al-Shabaab insurgents struck the village of Mnongodi, killing a handful of Tanzanian soldiers and police, before crossing back to Cabo Delgado. Locals now report that insurgents are gathering around Kibiti, a former stronghold of Islamist militants in southern Tanzania, where security forces cracked down in 2017, prompting many Tanzanian fighters to flee into Cabo Delgado.

Security and intelligence sources in East Africa fear that, as southern Tanzania faces more instability, it could act as a gateway for jihadists joining the fight not just in Northern Mozambique, but also in eastern DRC. There, an ISIS-affiliated group, the ADF, has been recruiting more Tanzanian militants, some of whom may have also fought in Cabo Delgado. Mozambican fighters have in the past gone through Tanzania on their way to the eastern DRC to receive training in ADF camps.

#### After dominating the battlefield, winning peace

Maputo and its partners are undoubtedly making progress toward bringing stability back to Cabo Delgado. The international military deployments have played a significant role in stemming the insurgency. Humanitarian assistance and development aid have also brought some measure of relief to the province's

beleaguered civilians, though hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced.

Both military and civilian officials, however, acknowledge that some form of political engagement is required to end the conflict. "We need more than just weapons to end this conflict, something more than military operations", says Mozambique's defence minister. The angry young men who comprise al-Shabaab joined up because they resent security force abuses and believe elites connected to Frelimo monopolise the economy, including illicit business, in Cabo Delgado.

Government officials and others who know insurgents say they will not lay down their arms unless they get a fairer share of the province's resources. "Aid money can help mitigate civilian suffering, but what the youth who are fighting really want is a sense of social justice and a permanent stake in the future of Cabo Delgado", says a government adviser. Mozambican security officials are in communication with some insurgents, but these conversations largely concern tactical matters.

It is likely that insurgents will find ways to keep their fight going, given that they have options ranging from falling back on ISIS support to moving into new territory. While Nyusi has urged al-Shabaab to surrender, officials say insurgents are not doing so in large numbers, choosing instead to melt back into the civilian population. Diplomats voice concerns about the safety of those who do turn themselves in, fearing that some could be disappearing in state custody. They warn that few will surrender if they fear ill-treatment at the authorities' hands. Continued insecurity, meanwhile, could lead authorities to prolong the military deployments in the north, which could provoke more discontent given the frequent extortion by soldiers at checkpoints.

To maximise their military advantage, Mozambique's African partners should push Maputo to open a dialogue involving political elites that bear influence on Cabo Delgado. Any talks could be geared toward striking a bargain over a viable future for ex-insurgents, which could, in turn, persuade more of them to surrender. Authorities and elites in Maputo and Cabo Delgado may thus have to decide what material promises they can make to fighters, including how they might participate in the gas and mining industries that are the basis of the province's wealth.

The authorities could also consider vetting former fighters and involving some of them in the planning of security arrangements for the province once the military campaign is over. They might also think about developing an amnesty policy for low-level insurgents and

setting up demobilisation camps where those who qualify could safely turn themselves in.

Dialogue, while potentially useful, will not in itself be enough. Undoubtedly, many in government as well as many civilians who have borne the brunt of al-Shabaab violence will find such engagement unpalatable.

The authorities will thus have to keep working to deliver benefits to the population, particularly to victims of conflict, for example by scaling up humanitarian and development assistance. This task will be easier if the conflict can be scaled down through dialogue with insurgents. But the authorities will also need to think about what they can do, not just to kill insurgents but also to apprehend and punish those whom they identify as the worst perpetrators of violence against civilians. Hence, even if dialogue achieves the surrender and rehabilitation of lower-ranking al-Shabaab fighters, the public will have some sense that justice is being served for the atrocities they have endured. As it stands, the authorities need to do more on this front: they are capturing many insurgents but prosecuting few.

Regional collaboration is also crucial. The government and its partners must step up their efforts – both individual and cooperative – to dismantle the financial, recruitment, training and IED proliferation cells linked to ISIS in East Africa. Research by *Crisis Group* shows that suspected jihadist and criminal networks operating in South Africa are channelling significant funds into the region. Criminal investigators there have started to identify suspects, including people from East Africa and the Horn, who have sent money to individuals with ties to ISIS in Kenya. Financial investigators in a few countries have gathered evidence that recipients have passed the money on to others, including militants involved in the Kampala attacks, but also people in the DRC, Tanzania and Mozambique. Somali and intelligence sources in the region report that the ISIS-linked faction in Puntland have been training Mozambican commanders.

States on the eastern side of the continent need to work together better to mitigate the ISIS threat, as collaboration to date has been poor. While the SADC is setting up a counter-terrorism centre in Tanzania to facilitate cooperation on, among other things, dismantling ISIS networks in member state jurisdictions, this organ will need information about related ISIS cells from the authorities in non-SADC states such as Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and Somalia, among others.

The AU should accordingly look to ease communication between SADC member states' law enforcement and judicial bodies and their

counterparts in other regions, such as the Horn and East Africa, which face the same transnational threat. Ideally, it would develop, in consultation with the SADC, IGAD and the East African Community, a shared transnational threat assessment, which they can then all use to develop appropriate, collective tactical responses.

Meanwhile, international military pressure on the insurgency will continue to be required. The SADC and the Rwandan authorities are now soliciting financial support to maintain their operations. While the EU has signalled that it would be willing to chip in to support SAMIM via its new funding mechanism, the European Peace Facility (EPF), Brussels is unlikely to want to foot the entire bill, as it has been doing for the AU's mission in Somalia, now in its 14<sup>th</sup> year.

Some European officials are also more in favour of supporting SAMIM, which has a regional mandate, than the Rwandan deployment, which they see as a bilateral matter for Maputo to manage privately. As such, the AU should step forward to at least help the SADC raise funds from other sources for SAMIM, which is facing resource and capacity issues. On their own, beefed-up deployments will still likely not be enough to vanquish the insurgency, but they will be able to keep denying the insurgents the space they would need to rebound in Cabo Delgado.

### Conclusion

The conflict in Northern Mozambique, now approaching its fifth year, is among the gravest threats to peace and stability on the continent. Mozambique and its neighbours in southern Africa as well as the Rwandan military have had a significant impact in stemming an insurgency that ISIS has claimed as its own. Yet military operations by themselves are unlikely to eradicate a rebellion that has grown out of grievances felt deeply by large sections of Cabo Delgado's youth.

Al-Shabaab elements are likely to embrace ISIS and seek its support to keep mounting disruptive attacks in their home province and possibly elsewhere in the country's north. Humanitarian and development aid money has started to cool tensions on the ground. It may dissuade some young men from taking up arms, but not enough of them.

Without government efforts to address the insurgency's political roots, especially through dialogue, the civilian population of Cabo Delgado will probably have to live through a prolonged period of conflict.

[Source: Crisis Group](#)

## ADDITIONAL ARTICLES:

- Six insurgents shot down by Nangade Local Force (P)
- Cabo Delgado: Minister defends “local forces” (E)
- Insurgents kill three, kidnap minors in Nangade District (E)
- Beheading of children continues in Cabo Delgado, says Save The Children (P)
- Authorities capture suspected insurgent informants on Ibo Island (P)
- Captured insurgents assisting FADM (E)
- Tanzanian nationals head the main terrorist bases in Cabo Delgado (P)
- Insurgency in illicit economy; smuggling is controlled by the elite and drives war, says new study (P)
- Mozambique: Visiting the scene of an Islamic State attack (E)
- The tentacles of terrorism in Cabo Delgado III: The backstage of the war (P)
- Niassa: Population of Mecula returns to origins after insurgent attacks (P)
- Niassa: Process for the return of people affected by terrorism in Mecula to end this week (E)
- Humanitarian response dashboard (January-December 2021) (E)
- Cabo Delgado, Nampula & Niassa Humanitarian Snapshot – December 2021 (E)
- Caritas Mozambique: Please support “Together for Cabo Delgado campaign” (E)
- Another BDF soldier dies in Mozambique (E)
- Terror threat in Cabo Delgado “threat to entire region” – Zimbabwe president (E)
- Zimbabwe donates 1,000 tonnes of maize to insurgency victims in Cabo Delgado Province (E)
- Rwanda offers to support economic recovery in Cabo Delgado (E)
- Cabo Delgado: Did President Nyusi pass through Rwanda to “give an update”? (P)
- “We will not build a plant surrounded by soldiers” – Pouyanne’s demands for reviving Mozambique LNG project (E)
- Further suspension of works would imply abandonment of TotalEnergies’s project (P)
- Five officers arrested on suspicion of rape (P)
- Police accused of extorting tourists on the beaches of Inhambane (P)
- Gang arrested for robbing homes in Inhambane (P)
- “Grupo 15” returns with firearms and terrorises motorcycle taxi drivers in Mocuba (P)
- Blood ties: Southern Africa caught in a web of murderous, drug-smuggling Brazilian gangs (E)
- Angoche: Drug dealers doing business in school grounds (E)
- Trafficker with 102 kg of heroin arrested in Mocuba (P)
- Customs seize goods in Nacala-Porto (E)
- Inspection seizes over four tonnes of fish in Zambézia (E)
- Workers call for release of Maputo businessman kidnapped on 22 December 2021 (E)
- Man arrested in connection with the recent abduction in Maputo City (E)
- Zambézia: Driver involved in accident that killed 28 was driving drunk (P)
- Four gunmen kidnap Mozambican national in South Africa (E)
- South African murdered in Maputo (P)
- Helmoed Römer Heitman: SA’s military is on a downward spiral towards becoming a mere militia (E)
- Thulsie Twins case could provoke local extremists and radicalise more recruits, terror expert warns (E)

## POLITICS

### New media law in Mozambique “is terrible” for journalists – NGO

The coordinator of the African programme of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ) considers that the new media law in Mozambique is “terrible” and defended that “it should never see the light of day”

“The new media law is terrible and should never see the light of day; it is a major violation of press freedom,” said Angela Quintal in an interview with *Lusa* about the situation of press freedom in Portuguese-speaking countries, following the attack on *Radio Capital*, in Guinea-Bissau.

For this former journalist in South Africa, in Mozambique, there is “an impunity that gives licence to those who want to attack journalists and censor the press, because they know there will be no consequences if they do so”.

In the case of Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the activist argues that criminal defamation is an error that dates back to colonial times and exists

in several African countries, but is particularly worrying in the case of Portuguese-speaking countries. “It is not only Lusophone Africa that has criminal defamation laws, there are also in Anglophone and Francophone countries, but in African Lusophone there seems to be the idea that the world is not watching, because the lingua franca is English or French,” Quintal explained.

“A great majority of people don’t understand Portuguese, and that’s why they don’t know what’s going on, but that’s precisely why it’s important for NGOs to show solidarity with what’s happening, governments should be ashamed to the point of changing laws,” Quintal stated.

The bills to regulate the exercise of journalism were approved on 27 October 2020, by the Mozambican Council of Ministers, with consultations by parliamentary commissions taking place before the discussion, and voting in the plenary of the National Assembly was scheduled.

In an interview with *Lusa* in November 2021, the executive editor of *Canal de Moçambique*, Matias Guente, a newspaper whose offices were set on fire in 2020 by persons still unidentified, said about the new law that “the impression that remains is that [the legislative package] was conceived in a police station” and that “journalists are treated as the enemy”.

The draft law provides that journalists lose the right to defend themselves in cases of defamation against the President of the Republic, although the right to defence is part of the Constitution.

There is also a redefinition of restrictions on private investment in the media and the overlapping between disciplinary and supervisory bodies.

[Source: Club of Mozambique / Lusa](#)

### **Harare and Maputo deepen economic ties**

Zimbabwe and the rest of the SADC countries are set to benefit from infrastructural development being undertaken by Mozambique, with Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nyusi committing to facilitate the emancipation of their people through economic development.

Mozambique has embarked on a massive rehabilitation of all its ports, roads, as well as railway lines linking it with Zimbabwe. Currently, Mozambique is constructing Machipanda railway line that will link the two countries, with discussion on the construction of a new port that will benefit Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa on cards.

A railway line from Sango Border in Chikwalakwala that will link with Maputo is being rehabilitated, with the Chinese Government also expanding Nacala Port. Zimbabwe transports sugar cane for export through Sango Border, Chikwalakwala railway line to Maputo, and the outside world.

In a friendly gesture, Mnangagwa, who was in Beira for a one-day official working visit, donated 1,000 tonnes of grain to help victims of insurgent attacks in Cabo Delgado and some parts of Mozambique.

Mnangagwa announced the donation in his address after witnessing the commissioning of four state-of-the-art locomotives and 150 wagons sourced by Mozambique from India.

The Indian government will also rehabilitate the railway lines that link Mozambique and SADC countries, including the Chikwalakwala line that links with Maputo.

“There is enough friendship between India and Mozambique. We have witnessed the delivery of four locomotives and 150 wagons and others are still coming. This is not only for Mozambique but also for countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Malawi that will be land-linked by the railway services,” said the President.

Like Mozambique, Mnangagwa said Zimbabwe was also implementing infrastructural development projects. “We have a similar programme unfolding in the rehabilitation of the railway system in Zimbabwe based on consensus facilities given by the Republic of India. Like Mozambique we are also collaborating with India,” he said

Nyusi, in his address, commended Zimbabwe for its unwavering support to the people of Mozambique. “I want to thank President Mnangagwa for his donation of 1,000 tonnes to the victims of terrorism. The kind gesture will go a long way. Also, Zimbabwe has been very supportive in terms of security. We have Zimbabwe officers participating in the training and development of our soldiers who are fighting against terrorism here. Mozambique will remain a partner of economic development of Zimbabwe,” Nyusi said.

Zimbabwe and Mozambique enjoy cordial bilateral relations, underpinned by strong historical and political bonds that date back to the era of the liberation struggle.

“We are also exploring areas of power and energy. We are neighbours and we will have partnerships so that we must not have language of politics only. I also told President Mnangagwa that the trained youth by Zimbabwean officers fought and resisted terrorists from occupying Paimar in Chimoio. We commend Zimbabwe for that”.

Friday’s (11 February 2022) meeting further deepened existing economic, political, cultural, and social relations between the sister countries. Mnangagwa and Nyusi discussed bilateral, continental, and global issues, and reaffirmed their commitment to further cooperate closely on multilateral issues.

Mnangagwa also took the opportunity to castigate countries that brought funding and aid to Africa with strings attached. “Countries like China, Brazil, India, and Russia give us good support without strings attached to it but countries I did not mention here put strings to their support and as SADC we don’t want that.”

[Source: The Herald Zimbabwe](#)

## ADDITIONAL ARTICLES:

- Hidden Debts: Finance Minister kept in the dark (E)
- Hidden Debts: Prosecutors hunt for Chivale (E)
- Hidden Debts: Renato Matusse must find another lawyer (E)
- Hidden Debts: “The enemy captured our security” (E)
- Hidden Debts: Huge expectation before hearing of Armando Guebuza (P)
- Hidden Debts: Architect received US\$3 million from Carlos do Rosário (P)
- Hidden Debts: “We did not discuss the creation of EMATUM” (P)
- Top ministers blame Manuel Chang and SISE for “Hidden Debts” (E)
- Adriano Maleiane: EMATUM debt was the only one registered in the Treasury (P)
- Privinvest paid for Rosário’s properties (P)
- Declarant denies “hammering” thesis of defendant António Carlos Do Rosário (P)
- The court has removed three lawyers from the “Hidden Debts” trial (P)
- World Bank cites Mozambique as a case study of the impact of lack of financial transparency (E)
- Defence dollars and private investments are President Nyusi’s tandem tasks (E)
- Government sets up asset recovery office (P)
- President Nyusi replaces heads of the Casa Militar, Civic Service and PRM’s deputy commander-general (E)
- Mozambican parliament resumes plenary sessions on 28 February 2022 (P)
- Government must reactivate and restructure the consultation forum on land to be framed in the law (P)
- President Nyusi warns INSS management about misconduct (E)
- Renamo opens political year with criticism of Frelimo’s “false promises” (P)
- Nampula: Citizens criticise opposition silence (P)
- Meet the entities that do not pay tolls in Mozambique (P)
- Government of Cabo Delgado surrenders to CDD work (P)
- AfDB and Gapi agree on Development Strategies (P)
- Resettlement claim dismissed in court case against Montepuez Ruby Mining (E)
- Mozambique again calls for lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe (P)
- President Nyusi to host Zimbabwe’s Mnangagwa in Beira (E)
- Olivia Machel meets Zimbabwe President in Harare (E)
- Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and President Nyusi meet in Kigali (E)
- EU-Africa summit can reaffirm cooperation between the two (E)
- SADC leaders to participate in the AU and EU Summit on 17-18 February 2022 (E)
- US senators urge officials not to exempt Credit Suisse after bribery case (P)
- Freedom Index 2021: Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have authoritarian regimes (P)
- Beira honours Daviz Simango (P)
- Mutarara Secondary School Board dismissed after 2021 final exam scandal (P)
- There are teachers who do not master the subjects they teach (P)
- Education Ministry withdraws “unsuitable” content from textbook (E)

## ECONOMY & BUSINESS

### Transport & Logistics

#### Coal boom triggers Mozambique’s biggest port to triple capacity

Grindrod Ltd., a Johannesburg-listed logistics operator, plans to triple capacity at its drybulk port terminals in Mozambique to cater for growing demand for coal exports from neighbouring South Africa, the company said Monday (14 February 2022).

Capacity at the company’s wholly-owned terminal at the Maputo Port, the country’s biggest, will grow to 4.5 million tons annually by the end of June 2022, from 1.5 million tons. While that at its 65%-held Matola coal terminal will increase to 12 million tons yearly from the current 7.3 million tons “in the short to medium term,” Grindrod said in a statement on its website.

The company’s decision comes as demand for coal has surged with economies bouncing back from COVID-19, and South African mining companies are searching for alternatives to export their goods due to snarl-ups at the nation’s own ports and railways, potentially costing billions of dollars in lost revenue.

Still, Mozambique is not without its challenges. Trucks crossing the South African border to Mozambique at times can wait up to three days in queues of more than 15 kilometres long. “Critical to both projects is unlocking road and rail bottlenecks along the corridor,” Grindrod said.

[Source: Bloomberg](#)

#### Indian Railways exports Cape Gauge Diesel Locomotives to Mozambique

The Indian Railways has exported four powerful Cape Gauge Diesel Locomotives, manufactured at Banaras Locomotive Works, to Mozambique. On 11 February 2022, Nyusi, in the presence of Mnangagwa, inaugurated the run of four Cape Diesel Locomotives at Beira in Mozambique.

Sharing details of this feat of Indian Railways (IR), Rajiv Jain (ADG PR of Railway), here on Saturday (12 February 2022) said that IR is proud to partner with Mozambique in enhancing their economic growth. “The 3,000HP Locomotives are currently being operated multiple units to haul 3,561 tonnes of coal from Coal mines to the port of Beira, hauling 43 wagons”, Jain said.

Jain added that the Cape Gauge Diesel Locomotives have been designed, manufactured, and financed by India for export in the spirits of Atamnirbhar Bharat.

Anjali Goyal, the General Manager of Banaras Locomotives Works (BLW), said that the BLW is deeply honoured that four Banaras Diesel Locomotives were inaugurated on 11 February 2022 jointly by the Presidents of Mozambique and Zimbabwe at Beira in Mozambique.

“The BLW is fully geared up to leverage its manufacturing capabilities for export of locomotives to sister countries in Africa at competitive rates. We look forward to more opportunities to play a key role in India’s International Economic Cooperation initiative in partnership with the Ministry of External Affairs and the RITES”, she said.

After Mozambique, the BLW is also attempting to expand its export growth to Africa also wherein an extensive cape gauge network is being developed. The Cape Gauge Diesel Locomotive has been manufactured at BLW with an AC-traction system and is capable of running at 100 kilometres per hour.

Jain said that the Cape Gauge Diesel Locomotives for exports are capable of hauling 2,255 tons at 100 kilometres per hour at the level track and maximum tractive efforts of 400N. “The most salient feature of this locomotive is availability ensured on-board water-closet toilet, the refrigerator and hot plate system for the locos. It is also equipped with a computer-controlled brake system and larger fuel tank of 6,000 litres for longer operation”, Jain said.

[Source: The New Indian Express](#)

### **Malawi soon to become one of the biggest users of Nacala Port**

The Malawi National Petroleum Company has announced that it will soon start importing fuel through the Nacala railway corridor. The initiative aims to address the high cost of road transport from the ports of Beira in Mozambique, Durban in South Africa and Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania.

Malawi’s largest strategic fuel reserve, at Kanengo in Lilongwe, is already connected to the Nacala rail network in Northern Mozambique, and work connecting the Mchinji-Salima section with the Blantyre fuel reserve, in Malawi’s largest commercial hub, is 92% complete.

The executive vice president of the National Petroleum Company of Malawi, Hellen Buluma, said that the conclusion of the work, and subsequent import of fuel, would make Malawi one of Nacala Port’s biggest users.

Buluma explained that the road corridors in Beira, Durban and Dar-Es-Salaam currently in use have entailed high costs for Malawi due to limited carrying capacity. Malawi pays US\$10.00 per ton per kilometre against the average SADC price of US\$7.00.

The high cost of transport affects Malawi’s economic competitiveness, hence the shift in business strategies from Beira, Dar-es-Salam and Durban to Nacala.

The city of Blantyre is about 2,300 kilometres from Durban in South Africa, as also from Dar-es-Salam in Tanzania, whereas it is only 960 kilometres from the Port of Nacala.

Malawi’s being a relatively small economy, with slow growth concentrated on a relatively small number of profitable products, the Port of Nacala is seen as a way of dealing with high fuel costs – to the detriment of Durban and Dar-es-Salam.

In Malawi, a litre of gasoline currently costs MZN95, and of diesel MZN90, which also adds to the cost of basic necessities.

About 17% of Malawi’s exports and imports of containerised cargo pass through the Port of Beira, and 13% of bulk cargo transiting the port is from that country.

[Source: Club of Mozambique / Lusa](#)

### **Oil & Gas**

#### **TotalEnergies “will take as much time as is necessary” for security to return**

TotalEnergies still intends to carry through its giant gas project in Mozambique, but is prepared to take “as much time as is necessary” for security to return to the region, CEO Patrick Pouyanné said on Thursday (10 February 2022).

“We have not decided to abandon this project at all,” Pouyanné assured journalists during a presentation of the group’s annual results.

“But in order to be able to relaunch the project, we will only do it when we are convinced that we can basically come back but not to leave again after six months, because that [would be] the end of the matter,” he added.

“We will only go [back] when we consider that the security conditions, not only of the site but of the population, that stability, a lasting peace, have returned to Cabo Delgado,” he added. “We will take as much time as is necessary.”

TotalEnergies, which had planned to start production in 2024, recently made 2026 its new target date.

[Source: Club of Mozambique / AFP](#)

## New gas report says LNG pathway “optimal” for South Africa

A new report on [\*The Role of Gas in South Africa’s Path to Net-Zero\*](#) argues in favour of a pathway based on the importation of LNG, which it describes as “optimal” because it minimises the risk of stranded assets and gas infrastructure lock-in post-2040.

In addition, such a pathway is less complex and capital intensive than ones based on the possible exploration and development of domestic gas fields and/or the building of a pipeline to import gas from Northern Mozambique.

Published by the National Business Initiative (NBI), Business Unity South Africa, and the Boston Consulting Group, the report forms part of a broader research and consultative process on the decarbonisation of key sectors of the South African economy. It concludes that gas can, if affordably supplied, play a role as a “transition fuel” to replace more emissions-intensive fossil fuels such as coal and diesel.

In addition, gas could complement battery storage to provide flexible capacity and enable a rapid scaling up of renewables, until alternative long-duration energy storage solutions and greener fuels become affordable.

The report assesses five possible pathways, including having no additional gas supply whatsoever – a scenario that is not recommended based on an analysis indicating that cumulative emissions would be 400 Mt to 600 Mt higher than under scenarios with additional gas supply.

Such an outcome is due, the report explains, to the prolonged use of more carbon-intense fossil fuels such as diesel and coal, before greener alternatives become economically viable.

Other pathways assessed include both the building of a gas pipeline linking South Africa to the Rovuma gasfields in Northern Mozambique and/or the development of domestic gas discoveries, such as Brulpadda and Luiperd.

It concludes, however, that the “LNG pathway” would be the optimal supply option to meet South Africa’s gas demand and to address the supply constraints from the diminishing Pande-Temane reserves, South Africa’s only current major source of gas supply.

The report argues that the LNG pathway carries relatively low infrastructure and technology lock-in risks once demand ramps down post-2040, noting that gas will have to be phased out entirely by 2050 and replaced with greener alternatives for South Africa to achieve a net-zero-by-2050 target.

In addition, the capital expenditure required to install floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) infrastructure (R20 billion to R50 billion) and an inland pipeline (R25 billion to R50 billion) would be far lower than the R200 billion required for a pathway based on an importation pipeline and the development of domestic deposits.

That said, any new investments in gas infrastructure should consider the future repurposing of the assets to use green gases, such as green hydrogen blends and green hydrogen.

The negative impact on the trade balance associated with the LNG pathway, the reports states, would need to be offset by new green export industries, such as a South African e-fuels industry.

The report assumes that South Africa’s potential future gas demand will be driven by the four key sectors of electricity, synthetic fuels production, industry and transport. It states that gas-to-power (GTP) plants will displace diesel and enable a high penetration of renewable energy in the power system by providing the flexible capacity to manage the long-duration intermittency that battery storage cannot currently address.

“As an alternative to diesel, the power sector can afford gas, for predominantly peaking capacity, at delivered prices of up to R300/GJ.” Given this high affordability threshold, the report states that GTP plants could serve as a demand anchor to enable the optimal supply option for South Africa. “It is therefore critical that energy planning policy gives clarity to the deployment, operating regime, and location of GTP plants beyond 2030.”

Should the LNG pathway be pursued, the report recommends a multi-hub approach with FSRUs in Richards Bay, Coega and Saldanha (in South Africa), as well as Matola (in Southern Mozambique). “In addition to Matola as a supply option, developing all three South African FSRUs in parallel emerges as the optimal supply scenario for South Africa.”

The report also urges the South African authorities to establish an enabling policy and commercial framework to procure gas on an aggregated basis and achieve economies of scale and enable supply infrastructure within the time and to the scale required.

However, risk of unconstrained demand and stranded supply infrastructure should also be actively managed. “A detailed view on the gas supply-demand economics and affordability across all sectors should inform the Gas Master Plan which should, in turn, provide clarity on the long-term demand and preferred supply pathway for South Africa.

“Policy and specific stakeholder engagement platforms should also be leveraged to promote investment, drive public-private partnerships and bilateral relations with Mozambique, and to invest in research and development for solutions

to address methane leakage and repurposing of gas infrastructure,” the report states.

[Source: Creamer Media’s Engineering News](#)

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES:

- GDP grew 2.16% in 2021 as Q4 growth accelerated to 3.32% year on year (E)
- Inflation of over 2% in January 2022 (E)
- Year-on-year inflation hits 7.8% in January 2022 (E)
- Financial inclusion suffers setback in the fourth quarter of 2021 (P)
- Standard Bank Pension Fund launched (E)
- Mkesh and Millennium Bim sign interoperability partnership (P)
- Investment company and Spain support small businesses in Cabo Delgado (P)
- Bazaruto with eight unexplored land concessions (P)
- Resisting fossil fuel extractivism in Southern Africa (E)
- NGO accuses Mozambican government of “submission” to the carbon business (P)
- Rio Tinto and ASIC close to Mozambique settlement (E)
- Syrah approves FID on expanding Vidalia AAM facility in US to process Mozambique graphite (E)
- Ex-police chief Antonio Mongo strengthens grip on tantalum (E)
- Mozambique port boon for Zimbabwean steel (E)
- Entrepreneurs call for Mozambique-South Africa border to open 24 hours (E)
- Barloworld upbeat about first quarter despite logistical challenges (E)
- LAM may no longer fly – says Auditor (P)
- Global Travel Transportation Market 2021-2026: CFB, Botswana Railways, Caminhos de Ferro de Mocambique, Malawi Railways, TransNamib, Swaziland Railway, TAZARA (E)
- Bridge collapse cuts Mavago-Lichinga connection (E)
- CTA gears up for CASP with projects estimated at US\$990 million (E)
- Court orders seizure of Startimes assets (E)
- Ministry of Fisheries imposes over MZN2 million in fines (E)
- World Bank disburses more than US\$1 million for the reconstruction of the Muziva irrigation system (P)
- Búzi already has an INSS delegation that will benefit at least 20,000 workers (P)
- Xinavane sugar workers call truce on strike (E)
- Mandatory sealing of beer and RTDs postponed for another three months (E)
- Zimbabwe is a “natural ally” in new investment projects – President Nyusi (E)
- Prime Minister do Rosaria urges UAE businesspeople to invest in Mozambique (E)
- Fabergé: Introducing the Ruby Rose, hand-carved from a Gemfields Mozambican ruby (E)

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

Health

**Sexual and reproductive health services boosted in wake of Tropical Storm Ana**

Making landfall on 24 January 2022 in Angoche District (Nampula Province), Tropical Storm Ana tracked westward toward Zambézia and Tete provinces, leaving behind widespread flooding, damaged and destroyed homes, leaving basic services cut off. Sofala, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado provinces were also hit, but less extensively.

**Collapsed houses and schools**

According to the latest data released by the National Institute for Disaster Risk Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres – INGD), the storm’s grim statistics include at least 38 killed, 207 injured, 12,000 houses in ruins, as well as 26 health centres, 25 water supply systems, 138 power poles, and about 2,275 kilometres of roads damaged.

Flooded crops have raised concerns about food security, and nearly 300,000 students no longer have schools to attend. “My house collapsed on

top of me, after I managed to take my children out,” said Florinda Culosa, 48, in Mocuba District. The house Culosa shared with six children and two grandchildren is gone. “I feel very sad about losing my house”, she added.

**Strengthening services**

In the aftermath of the storm, the United Nations (UN) Population Fund (UNFPA) is working with the government to strengthen sexual and reproductive health and protection services for the most vulnerable populations, particularly women and girls of reproductive age (15-49).

The 180,869 people affected by the storm includes an estimated 43,409 women of reproductive age and 5,127 pregnant women who will continue to need reproductive health services.”On the night the storm hit, in the maternity ward we assisted a mother as she gave birth to triplets, while the health centre was flooding and intense wind was ripping away parts of the roof,” said Filomena Aibo Joao, maternal and child health nurse at Alto Benfica Health Centre in Mocuba District. “The situation was scary, but we were very lucky, the mother and three babies survived”, she continued.

Mobile units have been deployed to provide sexual and reproductive health services, including contraceptives and maternal health medicines, in remote affected areas. In Tete Province, mobile clinics quickly resumed sexual and reproductive health and family planning services in communities isolated by floods.

#### Distribution of dignity kits

The UNFPA is distributing thousands of dignity kits to vulnerable women and girls to support their menstrual hygiene, sanitary and female dignity needs as well as tents that will allow damaged health centres to continue providing care.

After Noemia Hortênsia, 19, lost her house, belongings, and rice crop in the small village of Magica, she and her children went to the resettlement site of Sopa Parreirao, where she received one of more than 200 dignity kits that had to be transported by canoe because of the storm-damaged road and bridge. "My house fell because of the flooding. I was afraid that it was going to fall on me or on my son and daughter," she said. "We lost everything."

Source: UN News

### **Environment**

#### **Mozambique and Korea Cooperation Agency sign MoU on flood and drought early warning system**

Mozambique is cyclically affected by natural disasters, with extreme climatic manifestations, especially droughts, floods and cyclones, generally characterised by marked and often sudden deviations from the normal patterns of behaviour of climatic factors, with often catastrophic effects for the economy and society. In this sense, the country has reinforced its level of response to these events.

On 11 February 2022, the government, through the Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources (Ministério das Obras Públicas, Habitação e Recursos Hídricos – MOPHRH), the INGD together with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), signed a MoU for the modernisation of flood and drought warning in the country.

Recently, Mozambique has seen devastation caused by floods and inundations from Tropical Cyclones Idai, Kenneth and Eloise, and was recently affected by Tropical Depression Ana. To address this situation, a surveillance project will be implemented in the country by 2025, to provide early responses to floods, an initiative that will help just over 200,000 inhabitants of the Licungo watershed region in Zambézia Province, valued at US\$7.5 million.

With the materialisation of this project, it is expected to explore and mitigate the cyclical floods that occurred in the Licungo hydrographic basin through advance forecasting to prevent damage caused by rainwater.

According to Minister of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources, João Machatine, the signing of the MoU constitutes a "turning of the page" in the water resources management component, insofar as it will help the main actors in this sector to perform meticulous monitoring, with the possibility of making correct forecasts and avoiding greater damage, including to humans.

For example, Machatine said that "natural disasters cause many problems in the country, from an economic and social point of view. This is almost cyclical, until we have investments for dams". "This investment will, therefore, allow farmers to have timely information so that their crops, their inputs and their equipment are not lost with the floods; it will allow the populations that are still in the risk areas to leave these places before the occurrence of these events, it will allow the various sectors – commerce, education, health and others – to be able, in a timely manner, to carry out the logistics and provisioning of these inputs to these places so that – in the event of worse situations – the populations that become inaccessible are not held hostage to these inputs" or the lack of them.

For Machatine, the Flood Early Warning Systems Development Project comes at a good time, as the country has already been assisting families and infrastructures that are often damaged by climate change. The country needs infrastructure that fits the new reality, given that some works have passed more than their useful life.

So far, in addition to building infrastructure adapted to the 'new normal', the executive looks to rehabilitation, which is not to be confused with maintenance, as an alternative to deal with climatic events. The same event saw the launch of a work by Agostinho Vilanculos, an official assigned to the National Directorate for the Management of Water Resources, titled *Extreme Hydroclimatic Events*. The book addresses the methods of analysis and forecasting of floods and droughts and some of the opportunities that the country can adopt to minimise their impact.

At the launch, it became clear that the government will continue to cherish and support young people's initiatives, especially at a time when the internal market of literature is filled with works written and edited abroad, mainly in the area of Risk and Natural Disaster Management.

Source: Club of Mozambique / Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources (MOPHRH)

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES:

- COVID-19: PALOP have vaccination rates higher than the African average (P)
- US Government donates 840,000 Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccines (E)
- 1.2 million COVID-19 vaccine doses received from Canada (E)
- Cornelder de Moçambique delivers vaccines and rapid tests to Health Ministry (P)
- Country registered 3,135 leprosy cases in 2021, 52 more than 2020 (E)
- Mozambique diagnosed more than 90,000 new HIV infections in 2021 (P)
- “Safe Dating” alerts young Mozambicans to disease prevention (P)
- What are neglected tropical diseases? (E)
- Lin Group opens Lin Medcare in Maputo City (E)
- Matola Santos Health Centre closed one month after opening (P)
- Namibia teams up with Mozambique on diseases project (E)
- Deaths outside the hospital must be referred to the morgue of the Michafutene Cemetery (P)
- INAE to seize Kit Kat products that may contain glass (E)
- 2,500 ask Malawi for help after Tropical Storm Ana (E)
- Tropical Storm Ana Flash Update No.9 (As of 14 February 2022) (E)
- Moderate Tropical Storm Dumako weakens and becomes a low-pressure system (P)
- New Tropical Storm Dumako entered the Mozambique Channel on 16 February 2022 (E)
- Global Weather Hazards Summary 11-17 February 2022 (E)
- More than 4,000 classrooms are missing in Central Mozambique (P)
- On bridge collapse: Expert warns donors may be doing business with disasters (P)
- More than 3,000 people caught in flood in Maputo Province (P)
- Brackish water leads FIPAG to “isolate” two wells in Nampula (P)
- Forestry Law must ensure balance of interests (E)
- Gorongosa National Park and Nedbank Mozambique sign new partnership (E)

END

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CONTACT US



[www.focusholding.net](http://www.focusholding.net)  
[info@focusholding.net](mailto:info@focusholding.net)  
[weekly@rhula.net](mailto:weekly@rhula.net)

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